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In this paper, I use data from a new survey of employers in four large metropolitan areas to
analyze the flow of black applicants to different kinds of employers and the extent to which these
applicants are hired. The results show that less-educated black workers apply less frequently for jobs in
the suburbs than in central cities, especially at smaller establishments. Their lower tendency to apply for
suburban jobs is mostly accounted for by the higher costs to central-city black residents of applying
there, and by lower information flows as well. Black applicants, especially less-educated black males, are
also less likely to be hired at suburban establishments, particularly where they must deal with white
customers. These results suggest the need for policies to reduce the costs of applying for suburban jobs
and to improve the flow of information about suburban employment prospects to less-educated blacks,
and perhaps a need to complement such policies with more effective enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws in small suburban establishments.Black Applicants, Black Employees,
and Urban Labor Market Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent evidence suggests that minorities are much more likely to be employed at some types of
firms than others. For instance, federal contractors are more likely to employ minorities (and women)
than are noncontractors (Leonard, 1990); larger firms are more likely to employ blacks than are small
ones (Carrington, McCue, and Pierce, 1995; Chay, 1995; Holzer, 1996); and firms located near blacks in
metropolitan areas or having more black customers are more likely to employ blacks than are those
located farther away (Leonard, 1985; Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1996, forthcoming). The employment of
blacks in manufacturing has declined dramatically in some areas (e.g., the Midwest) while that of
Hispanics has risen (Bound and Holzer, 1993; Holzer, 1996). These factors reflect not only where blacks
become employed but also their overall earnings and employment levels (as I discuss below).
These results raise the question of whether these differences reflect decisions made on the supply
or the demand side of the labor market. On the supply side, blacks or Hispanics may choose to apply to
different firms than whites do. This might be due to differences across these groups in the costs of
applying to particular firms, perhaps associated with the locations of these firms or their recruitment
activities. The perceived benefits of applying to different firms (in terms of compensation or the
probabilities of being hired) might also vary across ethnic groups. Alternatively, firms may choose to hire
blacks or Hispanics from among their applicants at higher or lower rates, depending on the relative skills
of the applicants (i.e., relative to applicants from whites or other groups and relative to skill needs on
jobs), discriminatory preferences among employers across different groups, etc.
Devising policy approaches to deal with these issues depends on separating those rooted in
applicant behavior from those based on employer hiring. For instance, to the extent that a “spatial
mismatch” between inner-city minority residents and suburban jobs plagues metropolitan labor markets2
(e.g., Kain, 1992), some policy recommendations emphasize job placement or transportation assistance
(e.g., Hughes and Sternberg, 1992) while others emphasize residential desegregation and mobility
(Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1991; Kain, 1992). Indeed, the ongoing demonstration projects known as
“Bridges to Work” and “Moving to Opportunity” (both administered by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development) are based on the two approaches, respectively. But both of these approaches
assume that the employment and earnings of blacks will improve if their access to (or ability to apply for)
suburban employment is raised. Alternatively, if employers in these areas refuse to hire black applicants,
it may also take significant improvements in the enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
laws and/or skill enhancement to raise these employment rates.
Despite the importance of sorting out these sources of variance in black employment rates, little
serious attention has been paid to this issue in the research literature. Part of the reason for this is the
paucity of data on the demand side of the labor market in general, and on application rates across firms or
economic sectors by race more specifically. In other cases, the relevance of where different groups apply
for work has not even been recognized. For instance, the recent “audit studies” of employers (e.g., Fix
and Struyk, 1994) implicitly control for differences in the numbers of applicants firms receive by sending
matched pairs of black (or Hispanic) and white applicants to each firm (with both quantity and
observable quality of applicants equalized across racial groups), which assumes that observed
employment differences will be driven by demand-side choices exclusively. While this approach
provides a clean test of labor market discrimination, it does not allow for the self-sorting of white and
black applicants across different areas and sectors that clearly seems to occur in actual labor markets,
with consequences for both the quantity and relative quality of applicants received by different kinds of
employers.
In this paper, I analyze the extent to which different employers receive applications from blacks,
as well as their different tendencies to hire blacks from their applicant pools. I use data from a new3
survey of employers in several large metropolitan areas for this analysis. The theoretical relationship
between relative application and employment rates across groups is investigated in the next section, using
a supply and demand framework. Data and specification issues are discussed in the third section.
Empirical results appear in the fourth section, and a summary and discussion of policy implications are
presented in the final section.
II. APPLICATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT RATES BY RACE: THE THEORY
In this section, I present an informal discussion of the factors determining the application and
employment rates of blacks across firms. The discussion is consistent with other, more formal, treatments
in the literature of the search/application process across firms (e.g., Holzer, Katz, and Krueger, 1991;
Lang and Dickens, 1993).
In Figure 1, I show the determinants of relative application rates from blacks to different firms.
E(B) reflects the expected relative benefits that accrue to individual blacks from applying at firm 0 or 1,
while C represents the relative costs to them of doing so. The expected benefits are based on the
probability that an applicant at any firm will be hired, and the relative wages, benefits, and working
conditions that will accrue to the worker if this occurs. The costs of applying include both time and
expenses of filing the application and going through the screening process.
The number of applicants at each firm is determined at the point where benefits equal costs for
the “marginal” black applicant. For a given set of applicants, the average expected benefits they face at
each firm are then determined. The expected benefits per black applicant at each firm should decline with
rising numbers of applicants, as the likelihood that each applicant will be hired is reduced. The expected
relative benefits will also vary across firms, depending on the skill needs of the employer, the degree to
which the firms discriminate against blacks, or other institutional factors. For example, it appears thatFigure 1 










For instance, Freeman and Medoff (1984) show that blacks are relatively more likely to gain unionized
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employment than whites and to earn higher relative wages in unionized establishments. Krueger and Summers
(1987) show that less-skilled workers gain disproportionately higher wages in industries such as manufacturing and
the utilities, and blacks have always been concentrated among the less-skilled group. Bound and Holzer (1993)
show that blacks were heavily concentrated in manufacturing jobs in the Midwest as of 1970, though not so much in
other regions. As noted above, the effects of firm size on relative black employment have been documented by
Carrington et al. (1995), Chay (1995), and Holzer (1996).
We assume that the residential locations of white and black workers are given, as are the locations of
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firms. In the long run, the locations of each can vary and may well reflect the degree of access that each desires to
have to the other. In other words, employers may locate in the suburbs at least partly to avoid receiving applications
from blacks (Bloch, 1994), while blacks (as well as whites) may locate their residences in the suburbs, depending on
their desires for access to suburban housing and neighborhood amenities as well as for access to employers located
there (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993). But the ability of blacks to reside in the suburbs will be limited not only by
their incomes but also by housing market discrimination (Yinger, 1995).
large firms, unionized firms, or those in manufacturing/utilities have traditionally employed relatively
more blacks than other kinds of firms and/or have paid them relatively well.
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The costs to individual blacks of applying for jobs also vary across the firms and depend on
factors such as the location of the firm relative to the residential locations of blacks and other groups.
Given the disproportionate residential concentration of blacks in central cities caused by housing
segregation in metropolitan areas (e.g., Frey, 1995), it will generally be less costly for blacks to apply for
jobs in firms located in or near these areas.  The presence or absence of public transportation near these
2
firms will also affect the relative cost of applications from blacks, especially among those who lack
access to private automobile transportation (Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist, 1994; Holzer and Ihlanfeldt,
1996).
The results of some simple “comparative statics” analysis are illustrated in Figure 1. For a given
level of costs, firms with relatively high demand for black labor should attract more black applicants and
hire more black employees, as seen when comparing points A and B. More applicants apply at the firm
with higher relative demand until the probability that the marginal applicant is hired (and/or their relative
wages) is equalized between firms, although the average applicant at the higher-demand firm still faces
better opportunities. Thus, we should observe differences in employment rates out of the applicant pool6
We would expect this if, for instance, more discriminatory employers choose to locate in the suburbs, as
3
Bloch (1994) argues.
of blacks across these firms (or in their relative earnings), though the observed differences will be
reduced somewhat by the higher application rates at firms where relative demand is higher.
Comparing points A and C (or B and D), we find that firms at which it is relatively more costly
for blacks to apply (e.g., those located in the suburbs that are far from residential locations of blacks or
from public transit) should receive fewer black applicants and hire fewer black employees than those at
which it is cheaper to apply (e.g., those located in central cities, especially near to black residential areas
or public transit). But, in equilibrium, the expected benefits for the marginal applicant must equal the
costs at each firm, implying that we should observe few black applicants but high employment
probabilities (and/or relative wages) for those who do apply at high-cost firms.
Furthermore, if the costs and expected benefits to black applicants are positively correlated
across firms (e.g., comparing points A and D in Figure 1), the gaps in employment across firms will be
far greater than if the correlation is negative (points B and C). For instance, if firms located in the central
city have lower skill requirements or lower tastes for discrimination, the gaps in employment of blacks
between central-city and suburban employers will be greater than otherwise.
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This simple model can be modified or extended in a number of ways to incorporate a number of
important characteristics of urban labor markets. For instance, the actual expected benefits to blacks of
applying to any given firm may differ from those perceived by them if they have imperfect information
about employment opportunities in the relevant labor market. The quality of information about
employment opportunities may depend on the strength of social employment networks (e.g., Holzer,
1987) or on the recruitment activities of the firms themselves. Firms engaging in affirmative action
(whether because they are federal contractors or because they choose to do so) may also disseminate
information more broadly in the black community than they otherwise would, and employment7
For evidence that commute times or distances are correlated with education or automobile ownership, see
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Holzer et al. (1994) and Zax (1991).
opportunities among firms located farther from black residences may be less well known if racial/ethnic
employment networks are at least partly based on neighborhood of residence (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991;
Borjas, 1992). In any event, application and employment rates of blacks will clearly be lower at firms if
blacks perceive that the benefits to applying there are lower than they actually are.
Another important extension derives from the fact that black workers are heterogeneous in terms
of skills, residential location, and so forth. Thus, the expected benefits and costs of applying to the same
firm will differ among them. For instance, relatively more-educated blacks likely have lower
transportation costs to many suburban firms because they are more likely than less-educated blacks to
live in the suburbs and/or own automobiles.  They may perceive greater expected benefits to applying to
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various firms (especially in the suburbs) due to better information about job opportunities. Also, the
expected benefits they face may actually be higher as well, due to the greater relative employment
probabilities when they apply or relative compensation when they are hired for these jobs.
The self-selection process described above implies that the average quality, as well as quantity,
of black applicants may differ across firms. Furthermore, the quantity and quality of black applicants may
be inversely related when comparing firms across geographic areas. Thus, the average quality of black
applicants will be greater at firms located farther from black residential areas, implying that black
applicants should be relatively more likely to be hired at these locations, all else being equal.
Also, differences in the quantity or quality of applications received from blacks across firms
might well exist by gender, and they might differ between blacks and other disadvantaged minorities such
as Hispanics. Gender differences continue to exist in the distribution of employment across occupations
(e.g., Fuchs, 1989) that clearly reflect some combination of employee and employer preferences, but
gender differentials appear to interact with race as well in many analyses of occupational, employment,8
or earnings differences (e.g., Tigges, Browne, and Press, 1997). Gender differences exist within each
racial group in the tendency of workers to search for and commute to work (Zax, 1991). Qualitative
evidence of differences in employer preferences between black males and females has also been growing
(Kirschenman, 1991). All of these factors suggest that differences in the fraction of applications received
by firms from black males versus black females, as well as differences in hiring probabilities, might be
found even after controlling for occupation, location, and other characteristics of jobs and
establishments.
Comparing blacks with Hispanics, we find relatively lower residential segregation but also lower
educational attainment and test scores among the latter (Frey, 1995; Hauser and Phang, 1993). Blacks
and Hispanics also might experience different social networks and employer preferences in the labor
market (especially when comparing immigrants and the native-born, as in Waldinger, 1996, or Falcon
and Melendez, 1997). These should all contribute to differences between them in patterns of application
and employment rates across firms.
Finally, how will the various differences in application and employment rates across firms
contribute to differences in observed employment outcomes across these groups? At a minimum, these
factors should generate some employment segregation by race/ethnicity and gender across firms
(Carrington and Troske, 1998). But the extent to which such segregation results in lower wages and/or
employment for blacks (or Hispanics) then depends on the relative wages, skill requirements, and job
availability among those firms and areas to which each group has relatively greater access. If, for
example, firms are relocating away from predominantly black areas more rapidly than is the local
population, or if the firms remaining there pay lower wages (perhaps because of a “crowding” of blacks
into those jobs, or other differences in product markets, technology, etc.), then the evidence would
suggest that “spatial mismatch” is contributing to lower relative wages and/or employment among blacks.9
The methods by which the sample was drawn, and a variety of relevant issues related to response rates and
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selection, are discussed at length in Holzer (1996). Since the sample drawn is effectively weighted by size, we can
consider each firm as an observation without further size-weighting. On the other hand, some sample-weighting is
necessary for estimates to be based on representative samples, to adjust for the overrepresentation in the data of
noncollege jobs and jobs filled by members of black households.
Since the sample of establishments is roughly weighted by current employment size, it does not give
6
additional weight to firms that do considerable hiring due to high turnover rates or net employment growth. High-
turnover or high-growth job categories within establishments receive somewhat greater weight in this sample,
though the occupational distributions here are quite similar to those that appear in the 1990 census for all employees
in these metropolitan areas.
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
The data used here are from a survey of 3,200 employers in four major metropolitan areas:
Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. They were collected in telephone interviews between June
1992 and May 1994 with the individual at each establishment who was responsible for new hiring into
noncollege positions (or certain specific occupations).
5
Respondents were asked a wide range of questions about the overall establishment and the last
job filled there, as well as the last worker hired into that job. Since establishments were drawn to
generate a sample that was weighted ex ante by establishment size, a sample of the most recently filled
jobs at these establishments constitutes a relatively representative sample of new jobs being filled in the
labor force.
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We first present some summary statistics below on the percentages of applicants who are black at
each establishment, the percentages of new hires who are black, and the ratio of the latter to the former.
This ratio represents the conditional demand for any group of black applicants, based on their
characteristics. These data are presented overall and by the educational requirements and occupational
category of the job, as well as by industry and size of the establishment.
We then present estimated equations of the following form:
RApps  = a + bX  + cX + e (1) jk k j jk
R  = d + eX  + fX + n (2) jk k j jk10
The hiring requirement variables are dummies for whether each of the following is absolutely necessary or
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strongly preferred: college or high school diplomas, specific experience, previous training, and references. The task
variables are whether each of the following must be performed on a daily basis: direct contact with customers (in
person or on the phone), reading/writing of paragraph-length material, arithmetic, and use of a computer.
where R represents whether the last worker hired is black, RApps represents the percentage of applicants
who are black, j and k denote job and establishment respectively, and X includes control variables. Xk
includes variables for geographic location of the establishment—i.e., Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) dummies, whether it is located in the central city, its relative distance from white and minority
populations, and whether it is located near (i.e., within one-quarter mile) a public transit stop—and
controls for 1-digit industry, establishment size, and the presence of collective bargaining. X includes j
controls for various hiring requirements and tasks performed daily on the job.
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These equations are reduced forms to explain the demographic composition of applicants and the
relative demand for these applicants, conditional on their characteristics. The X and X  variables have jk
been chosen to reflect the likely determinants of relative application costs and relative expected benefits,
where the latter determine employment as well. For instance, occupation differences reflect skill
requirements that should influence hiring probabilities across the two groups; industry, establishment
size, and presence of collective bargaining affect relative hiring probabilities (either perceived or actual),
as noted above; geographic variables reflect the relative costs to blacks of applying for jobs; and other
variables, such as use of affirmative action and/or recruitment methods, likely reflect preferences or
information flows across groups.
Since the racial composition of a firm’s applicants directly affects the race of those persons it
hires, RApps might have been included among the determinants of R in equation (2). However, the
application rate is no doubt measured with some error by respondents to the survey, which is likely to
generate a downward bias in estimated coefficients on that variable. Furthermore, the theory above
suggests that the application rate from blacks should respond to the likelihood that blacks will be hired at11
any firm, thereby making this applicant rate endogenous with respect to observed employment outcomes.
Because of these problems, I choose instead to estimate reduced-form versions of both equations.
Then, to infer the effect of any given characteristic of jobs or establishments on the probability of
being hired among blacks who apply for specific jobs, I calculate ratios of predicted values of black new
hires to applicants, based on estimated coefficients from equations (1) and (2). In generating these
predicted values, all independent variables are assigned their mean values except for the particular
characteristic in question. These calculations are described in more detail below.
But, when considering either the summary data or the equations, some caveats must be noted. For
one thing, the endogeneity of black application rates with respect to employment probabilities should
bias the ratios of coefficients or predicted values to one, thus understating differences across firms in the
conditional demand for blacks. Where such differences are observed, they can be interpreted as lower
bounds to the true differences in relative demand. As noted above, employment probabilities at firms
where the costs to blacks of applying are high will also appear quite high (because these firms receive so
few applicants), thereby generating overestimates of demand for black applicants at such firms.
Furthermore, the relative quantities of black applicants at each firm are observable but their
relative qualities are not. If black applicants of varying qualities self-select into different firms, the same
hiring behavior (conditional on particular characteristics of applicants) across these firms may generate
differences in observed conditional hiring rates. However, where estimated differences in conditional
hiring rates can be observed that go in the opposite direction from those predicted by the relative quality
of the black applicant pool, we can infer differences in relative demand for black labor across
establishments that might well be attributable to differences in employer preferences for black labor.12
Application rates were gauged in the survey only for black males, black females, Hispanics, and Asians.
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The latter group is implicitly included along with whites in all calculations here.
The ratios presented in Table 1 represent the ratios of means of new hires to applicants, rather than means
9
of ratios defined at the individual level. Since only one new hire is described in the data for each establishment, it
would be impossible to define such a ratio at the establishment level.
Weighted averages of these ratios across groups, weighted by the percentages of applicants accounted for
10
by each group, should sum to 1.
IV. RESULTS
A. Summary Statistics
In Table 1 I present summary data on the percentage of applicants and new hires at
establishments who are white, black, and Hispanic. These appear separately for males and females among
blacks, and for establishments located in the central-city and suburban sections of their respective
metropolitan areas.  In addition to the percentages of applicants and new hires who are black, I also
8
present the ratio of new hires to applicants for each group, as a measure of labor market demand for these
applicants (conditional on their characteristics and those of the jobs to which they are applying).  Ratios
9
less than 1 for any group indicate a relative disinclination among employers to hire applicants from that
group, while ratios greater than 1 indicate a relative inclination to hire from the group.  All means are
10
sample-weighted.
The results show that blacks and Hispanics together account for roughly 43 percent of applicants
and 32 percent of new hires in these four metropolitan areas. The incidence of Hispanic applicants and
new hires is overwhelmingly concentrated in Los Angeles (and, to a much lesser extent, in Boston). The
new hire rates are roughly proportional to the fractions of blacks and Hispanics in the relevant local
populations, while the application rates exceed these ratios. This is to be expected, since blacks and
Hispanics should be more heavily concentrated among job seekers than in the population or labor force
more generally and because of their higher rates of unemployment.13
TABLE 1
Mean Application and New Hires Rates: By Race, Gender, and/or Location
               Total                            Central City                         Suburbs             
Apps NH Ratio Apps NH Ratio Apps NH Ratio
Whites .573 .683 1.192 .428 .559 1.306 .651 .762 1.171
Blacks .274 .173 .631 .389 .269 .692 .206 .112 .543
Males .149 .085 .570 .208 .130 .625 .115 .055 .478
Females .125 .089 .712 .181 .139 .768 .091 .057 .626
Hispanics .153 .144 .941 .183 .172 .940 .143 .126 .881
Note: Asians are included in the sample of “whites” above. All means are sample-weighted. “Apps” and
“NH” represent the percentages of applicants and new hires accounted for by each group, while “Ratio”
represents the ratio of the latter to the former.14
This is, to some extent, accounted for by the fact that central-city versus suburban differences in Los
11
Angeles (where most of the Hispanics in the sample are found) are less pronounced than in other metropolitan areas
in terms of where different ethnic groups live and work.
Some distinct patterns can also be found in the ethnic composition of applicants across
geographic areas. For instance, the share of black applicants is almost twice as large in central cities as in
suburban areas, which parallels the relative residential concentrations of blacks in these areas. Hispanics
also account for greater percentages of applicants in central cities, though the geographic differences are
less than for blacks.  Thus, where people seek employment is clearly influenced by where they live,
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perhaps because of costs associated with long-distance searching or commuting, or because of limited
information about employment prospects at more distant locations, or even because of perceived hostility
in areas where few residents of one’s own group reside.
The ratios of new hires to applicants also show several distinct patterns: (1) These ratios are
highest for white applicants and lowest for blacks in all locations; (2) they are higher for black females
than for black males in all locations; and (3) they are higher in central cities than in the suburbs for both
black males and black females.
These findings are discussed at greater length elsewhere (Holzer, 1996, forthcoming). Because
the hiring rates for any group are conditional on characteristics of the relevant applicant pool, they could
reflect differences in the process of self-selection (or matching) of applicants to employers. Thus, if
whites or Hispanics have better employment networks than blacks, providing them with better
information about where to apply, the ratios of hires to applicants observed among whites or Hispanics
would be higher.
Alternatively, differences in these ratios could reflect differences in employer perceptions of the
relevant ethnic populations, which might reflect real differences in skills across these groups or
discriminatory attitudes among employers. On average, skill levels (as measured by educational
attainment or test scores) are higher among whites than minorities but are generally lower among15
Educational levels are higher among blacks living in the suburbs than those in the central city, while the
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opposite is generally true among whites (Holzer, 1996). Wider geographic search patterns are also found among
more educated employees, as discussed by Holzer et al. (1994).
Raphael, Stoll, and Holzer (1998) show that even when the individuals in charge of hiring in the suburbs
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are black, they are still less likely to hire black applicants than are comparable central-city employers. Whether this
reflects discrimination on the part of black suburban managers as well (who perhaps have incorporated the
perceptions of their white neighbors and supervisors) is difficult to infer from the data.
Hispanics than blacks (Mare, 1995; Hauser and Phang, 1993). In fact, the higher ratios for Hispanics than
blacks and for black females than black males are consistent with qualitative evidence on employer
preferences across these groups (Waldinger, 1996; Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991; Kirschenman,
1991). This ethnographic evidence suggests that employers often prefer other ethnic groups (especially
immigrants) to native-born blacks, since they perceive better attitudes and work ethic among the former
and generally fear young black men more than their female counterparts.
The higher ratios of new hires to applicants among blacks in the central city than in the suburbs
are also unlikely to reflect differences in relative applicant skills, since these are likely higher for blacks
in the suburbs than in the central city.  Furthermore, the ratios in the suburbs are more likely to be
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upward biased, as the higher costs that blacks incur (on average) when applying to jobs there generate
fewer applicants who presumably face higher employer probabilities in equilibrium. The lower tendency
of suburban employers to hire black applicants might therefore reflect more discriminatory attitudes
toward blacks there, perhaps because of a propensity of discriminatory employers to locate in suburban
areas (Bloch, 1994), or an actual causal effect of central-city location on employer behavior (as more
direct contact with minorities or greater scrutiny of their behavior leads employers there to be less
discriminatory).
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Overall, the data summarized in Table 1 suggest strong differences across geographic areas in the
costs of applying for employment among blacks and Hispanics, as well as strong differences in the
conditional demand for these applicants, relative to whites and to each other, that are also partly based on
the geographic location of establishments.16
Unfortunately, the small sizes of samples of establishments in construction and the public sector limit our
14
ability to draw strong inferences about hiring patterns in these sectors.
Additional summary results appear in Table 2, where I present the percentages of applicants from
different race/gender groups by a variety of job/establishment characteristics, such as educational
requirements or occupational category of the job, industry, and establishment size. Part A of the table
presents these results for black and Hispanic applicants, while part B of the table presents results for
black males and black females.
A number of important results appear in part A of Table 2. Jobs located in central cities attract
many more black applicants if the jobs have lower educational requirements and are not in
professional/managerial occupations. On the other hand, this is much less true in the suburbs. Put another
way, the ratio of black applicants for jobs requiring high school or less to jobs requiring college is much
lower than in central cities. Data by occupation tell a similar story—namely, blue-collar and service
occupations in the suburbs draw relatively fewer black applicants than do white-collar jobs.
By industry, we find that construction and public sector establishments in the suburbs draw the
fewest black applicants (relative to what they draw in central cities) and that suburban establishments in
manufacturing, retail trade, and service industries also attract relatively fewer black applicants than those
in the utilities and wholesale trade.  And, while small establishments in both locations draw fewer black
14
applicants than medium-sized and large establishments (where the three categories are defined as 1–50,
51–100, and 101 or more employees), the gap between black applicants at large versus medium-sized and
small establishments is particularly large in the suburbs.
Taken together, these results suggest that less-educated blacks are much less likely to apply for
suburban jobs, especially at small and medium-sized establishments, for which they may be well
qualified. The results are consistent with the prediction based on the theory outlined above—namely that
the high costs of applying for jobs in the suburbs for blacks residing in the central city leads to a self-17
TABLE 2
Mean Application Rates and Ratio of New Hires to Applicants:
By Job and Firm Characteristics
   Central City          Suburbs          Central City        Suburbs     
Apps Ratio Apps Ratio Apps Ratio Apps Ratio
A.                         Blacks                                             Hispanics                   
Educational Requirements
College degree .240 .492 .173 .266 .262 .691 .110 .482
High school diploma .427 .698 .216 .574 .131 1.023 .138 .928
No requirement .478 .793 .213 .728 .256 1.164 .192 1.073
Occupations
Managerial/professional .293 .396 .181 .436 .249 .723 .092 .609
Clerical/sales .377 .719 .216 .472 .130 1.069 .139 .799
Crafts .350 .806 .126 .857 .301 .904 .203 .936
Operative/labor .466 .790 .228 .741 .283 1.127 .211 1.047
Service .621 .928 .253 .613 .116 1.284 .137 1.299
Industries
Construction .528 .326 .170 .618 .056 .000 .125 .648
aa aa
Manufacturing .331 .577 .173 .613 .319 .931 .234 .722
TCU .365 .803 .312 .769 .105 .552 .082 .598
Wholesale trade .330 .533 .242 .343 .189 .794 .166 .922
Retail trade .575 .767 .256 .625 .114 1.316 .119 .866
FIRE/services .366 .667 .190 .437 .195 .949 .115 1.052
Public .594 .902 .152 1.211 .059 .000 .060 4.300
aaaa aa a a
Employees
1–50 .380 .639 .178 .449 .130 1.054 .117 1.017
51–100 .486 .669 .194 .959 .191 .806 .204 .691
> 100 .378 .751 .261 .513 .271 .860 .176 .784
(table continues)18
TABLE 2, continued
   Central City          Suburbs          Central City        Suburbs     
Apps Ratio Apps Ratio Apps Ratio Apps Ratio
B.                   Black Males                                    Black Females                
Educational Requirements
College degree .096 .740 .091 .319 .144 .326 .082 .207
High school diploma .235 .506 .119 .445 .192 .932 .097 .732
No requirement .282 .851 .132 .674 .196 .709 .081 .815
Occupations
Managerial/professional .118 .517 .084 .452 .175 .314 .097 .423
Clerical/sales .194 .490 .116 .224 .183 .962 .100 .760
Crafts .235 .745 .099 .848 .115 .930 .027 .889
Operative/labor .377 .804 .158 .854 .089 .730 .070 .486
Service .321 .907 .138 .565 .300 .950 .115 .661
Industries
Construction .424 .406 .158 .665 .104 .000 .012 .000
aa aa
Manufacturing .219 .553 .105 .610 .112 .625 .068 .618
TCU .251 .952 .205 .702 .114 .482 .107 .897
Wholesale trade .253 .490 .149 .315 .077 .662 .093 .387
Retail trade .330 .788 .147 .463 .245 .739 .109 .844
FIRE/services .163 .521 .094 .372 .203 .783 .096 .490
Public .374 .701 .087 .414 .220 1.241 .065 2.277
aaaa aa a a
Employees
1–50 .212 .538 .105 .381 .168 .768 .073 .548
51–100 .271 .716 .109 .716 .215 .609 .085 1.271
> 100 .190 .689 .138 .529 .188 .814 .123 .496
Based on fewer than 20 observations.
a 19
When these computations are limited to establishments in Los Angeles for both blacks and Hispanics,
15
blacks also show a relatively greater tendency to apply to suburban establishments than they do in the other
metropolitan areas.
selection process in which the relatively more-skilled black workers apply to jobs in the suburbs more
frequently, while unskilled blacks apply overwhelmingly to jobs in the central city that do not require
high skills. Furthermore, highly skilled workers generally have more information about job opportunities
over a wider geographic range than do less-skilled workers, which might lead the former to search over a
wider range (Bound and Holzer, 1996; Ihlanfeldt, 1997, forthcoming). These results are also consistent
with evidence from household surveys indicating that more-educated blacks may search over a wider
geographic range than less-educated blacks, especially in the suburbs (Farley, Holzer, and Danziger,
1998).
The greater differences in application rates from blacks across industries and firm size categories
in the suburbs than in central cities also suggest that, to receive many applications from black workers,
the suburban establishments must be unusually salient or generate higher expected returns to search.
Since large establishments are generally better known, pay higher wages, and seem to discriminate less
than smaller establishments, it is not surprising that the former will attract more black applicants,
especially in the suburbs where application costs are high for blacks. Similar arguments can be made as
well for the utilities and wholesale trade relative to other sectors in the suburbs.
The pattern of where Hispanics apply for work differs somewhat from that observed among
blacks. In particular, smaller suburban establishments attract many Hispanic applicants, and those in
construction, the public sector, and retail trade draw many as well (relative to the service sector). By
education and occupation, it is professional/managerial jobs in the suburbs and/or those that require high
school degrees that draw relatively few Hispanic applicants. These results are, however, at least partly
attributable to the fact that Hispanics are much more heavily concentrated in Los Angeles and Boston
than are blacks.  Applicant patterns by gender differ somewhat among blacks as well, with more-
1520
educated black males being relatively more likely to apply for suburban jobs than their female
counterparts.
The ratios of new hires to applicants by race and/or gender also show some noteworthy results.
In general, blacks are less likely to be hired in many sectors where they apply less frequently—e.g., in
jobs requiring college, in professional/managerial occupations, and in smaller and/or suburban
establishments. As suggested by the theory outlined above, black applicants are choosing to apply for
work where their chances of being hired are greater, which certainly indicates some rationality in the
self-selection process. As noted earlier, this implies that differences across groups in conditional
probabilities of being hired will be downward biased to some extent, because establishments/jobs with
relatively high demand for blacks receive disproportionately many applicants, of whom somewhat fewer
are then hired.
Still, some important differences appear in these conditional probabilities. When comparing
suburban establishments to those located in the central city, the likelihood of black applicants being hired
is relatively lowest in clerical/sales and service jobs, in the trade and service industries, and in small and
medium-sized establishments. Comparing blacks with Hispanics, the latter are more likely to be hired
across a wide range of jobs and establishments, with the gap between the two groups being particularly
large in suburban establishments. Furthermore, this fact is not attributable to the high concentration of
Hispanics in Los Angeles, since it is true within that metropolitan area as well as in the others considered
here.
By gender, black males are relatively more likely than black females to be hired into
professional/managerial jobs and those requiring college, especially in the central city. But they have
more trouble than black females being hired into jobs requiring less education, especially in the suburbs.
The tendency for black males to be hired into clerical/sales jobs in small suburban establishments,
especially in retail trade, is strikingly low.21
These results might still be consistent with some discrimination against Hispanic applicants in the labor
16
market (Kenney and Wissoker, 1994), but they suggest that Hispanic applicants are more able than blacks to locate
sectors in the economy where they will not face such discrimination.
To be consistent across equations (1) and (2), I present ordinary least squares estimates only in Table 3.
17
These equations have also been estimated using tobit, which generates qualitatively similar estimates that are
occasionally a bit larger than those presented here.
Of course, it is hard to infer the exact extent to which these patterns in relative hiring rates reflect
differences in discriminatory employer behavior as opposed to other factors (such as the relative quality
of applicants), but at least some of the city/suburban differences in hiring suggest discriminatory patterns.
In particular, the greater reluctance of suburban employers to hire blacks in smaller establishments
suggests greater discrimination there, perhaps because employers feel less vulnerable to legal challenges
under EEO laws (Holzer, forthcoming). Also, the low representation of blacks in white-collar or service
jobs in the trade sectors suggests that employers may be catering to the discriminatory preferences (real
or perceived) of their customers (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, forthcoming). The particular aversion to hiring
black males into many of these jobs is consistent with the qualitative evidence of greater employer fear of
this group that was mentioned above. The greater success of Hispanic applicants overall suggests some
important differences in employer perceptions and preferences across these groups. These, along with the
choices of the applicants themselves, should have implications not only for where blacks work but for
their overall employment outcomes.
16
B. Determinants of Applications from Blacks: Regression Results
In this section I present more formal statistical analyses of the determinants of black applicants to
jobs and establishments, based on regression results for equation (1). All equations are sample-weighted.
Some results are presented for all jobs while others are presented only for jobs not requiring college
degrees.
17
Results from four specifications are presented in Table 3. In the first specification, I include
basic characteristics of jobs and establishments, such as skill demands on the job (measured by whether22
TABLE 3
Regressions for the Percentage of Applications Accounted for by Blacks
    All Jobs                                           Noncollege Jobs                                        
11234
Educational Requirements
College degree -.143 (.029) ————
High school diploma -.040 (.020) -.042 (.019) -.038 (.018) -.029 (.017) -.029 (.017)
Occupations
Clerical/sales .018 (.023) .008 (.026) -.005 (.025) -.026 (.023) -.020 (.023)
Crafts -.034 (.035) -.044 (.036) -.065 (.035) -.063 (.031) -.048 (.031)
Operatives/laborers .028 (.032) .015 (.033) .012 (.031) -.005 (.028) -.003 (.028)
Service .069 (.031) .052 (.033) .028 (.031) .002 (.028) .005 (.028)
Industries
Construction -.074 (.060) -.087 (.057) -.076 (.054) -.005 (.049) -.017 (.049)
Manufacturing -.049 (.029) -.068 (.028) -.062 (.027) .006 (.026) .001 (.026)
TCU .026 (.041) .043 (.042) .028 (.040) .077 (.037) .067 (.036)
Wholesale trade -.082 (.037) -.073 (.037) -.066 (.036) .011 (.032) .008 (.033)
FIRE/services -.007 (.024) -.033 (.024) -.043 (.023) -.020 (.020) -.025 (.020)
Public -.167 (.066) -.203 (.063) -.191 (.060) -.119 (.054) -.169 (.055)
Employees
1–50 -.048 (.018) -.089 (.020) -.096 (.019) -.092 (.017) -.072 (.018)
50–100 -.031 (.027) -.064 (.029) -.059 (.027) -.064 (.025) -.053 (.025)
Unionization .091 (.024) .087 (.027) .034 (.027) .036 (.024) .048 (.024)
Central city .139 (.019) .174 (.020) .069 (.022) .052 (.019) .055 (.019)
Public transit within ¼ mile — — .064 (.018) .052 (.016) .052 (.016)
Relative distance to blacks — — -.453 (.049) -.280 (.045) -.271 (.045)
Black customers — — — .555 (.083) .546 (.082)
Black customers*customer
contact — — — .048 (.088) .050 (.087)
Black respondent — — — .092 (.030) .073 (.030)
Affirmative action in recruiting ———— - .007 (.015)
(table continues)23
TABLE 3, continued
    All Jobs                                           Noncollege Jobs                                        
11234
Recruiting Methods
S i g n s / w a l k - i n s ———— .007 (.017)
R e f e r r a l s ———— .021 (.022)
N e w s p a p e r s ———— .035 (.015)
State/community agencies ———— .074 (.017)
Private agencies ———— .010 (.019)
Unions/schools ———— - .007 (.016)
R .235 .259 .326 .456 .473
2
Sample size 1235 1141 1141 1141 1141
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories are “No requirements” for Educational Requirements,
“Managers and professionals” for Occupations, “Retail trade” for Industries, and “> 100” for Employees.24
The distance of each establishment to various residential population groups has been calculated as the
18
weighted average of the distance between the centroids of the establishment’s census tract and those of each other
census tract in the metropolitan area, weighted by the percentage of the relevant population group that lives in that
census tract (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1996). The relative distance to the black population is then the ratio of average
distance to the black and white populations, respectively.
the job requires college or high school degrees, and by occupation dummies). I also include a variety of
establishment-level characteristics, such as location between and within MSAs (measured by MSA
dummies and dummies for central-city locations within MSAs rather than suburbs), industry,
establishment size, and presence of collective bargaining.
The next two specifications include additional measures that might account for the geographic
patterns of applicants within metropolitan areas. The first of these includes proxies for the cost borne by
blacks in applying to an establishment: whether the establishment is located within one-quarter mile of a
public transit stop and its relative distance to the black and white populations in an MSA.  The next
18
equation also adds a measure of the fraction of customers at the establishment who are black as well as a
dummy variable for whether the survey respondent (who is in charge of hiring) is black, as measures of
employer preferences for blacks. The first of these variables is interacted with a dummy for whether the
job involves direct contact between customers and employees in the job, since the race of customers
should only be directly relevant where such contact exists (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, forthcoming). To the
extent that the race of customers affects applicants (or employment) in jobs not involving contact, we
might infer that the effect reflects some other characteristic of the establishment, such as its
information/contacts or simply visibility within the black community.
Finally, the fourth specification includes more explicit measures of information dissemination
among potential black applicants, such as a dummy for whether the establishment uses affirmative action
when recruiting, and dummies for whether each of a set of recruitment methods was used in hiring for the
last-filled position.25
Though the individual coefficients on occupation and industry dummies are often not significant by
19
conventional standards, F-statistics indicate that both of these categories of variables are jointly significant in all
specifications presented.
The one notable exception is the suburban public sector, where few blacks apply despite relatively high
20
probabilities of being hired (as seen in Table 2).
A number of findings in the summary data above are confirmed in Table 3. Black applicants are
less likely to apply for jobs that require formal degrees, especially college, and they are somewhat more
likely to apply for unskilled occupations (such as service jobs) than for professional/managerial ones,
even controlling for educational requirements. By industry, blacks are more likely to apply to the utilities
(especially among the less-educated) and less likely to apply to the construction, manufacturing,
wholesale trade, and public sectors. Blacks are also more likely to apply to larger or more heavily
unionized establishments.  Most of these differences can also be found below with regard to the
19
probabilities of black applicants being hired—in other words, blacks are more likely to apply to jobs
where their expected benefits (in terms of being hired) are higher as well.  The establishments that
20
receive many black applicants are also those that tend to pay relatively higher wages to blacks, as noted
above. Many of the estimated effects are also larger when the sample is limited to jobs that do not require
college degrees, though similar patterns can generally be observed for both samples.
By geographic location, it is clear that the tendency of establishments in central cities to obtain
more black applicants continues to hold (in the first column of Table 3), even after controlling for many
other characteristics of establishments and jobs. But the size of this effect is dramatically reduced in
column 2. The results suggest that proximity to public transit and to the black residential population can
account for most of the greater tendency of central-city firms to receive applications from blacks. Thus,
differences in the costs of delivering applications to firms appear largely to account for the geographic
patterns observed in where blacks apply for work.
The race of its customers also has a large effect on the tendency of blacks to apply at an
establishment. The additional effect of customers in contact jobs is positive as well, but much smaller26
Controlling for race of customers also eliminates some of the industry effects noted earlier, as
21
“customers” outside of the retail trade and service sectors are generally likely to be other business owners or
managers who are frequently white.
F-tests generally reject equality in these estimated equations between the two geographic areas.
22
The differences between central cities and suburbs in the effects of recruitment methods on applicant
23
flows are generally not significant for individual methods. However, as a group they are significant in the central
city at the 5 percent level (but not in the suburbs).
and not significant. This suggests that the primary effect of having black customers on the receipt of
black applicants is through some other mechanism, such as information or visibility.  Having black
21
respondents in charge of hiring also has a positive effect on the probability of receiving applications from
blacks, perhaps indicating another mechanism through which information about available jobs is
disseminated in the black community (Raphael, Stoll, and Holzer, 1998). Finally, we note that some
recruiting methods—especially state or community agencies and newspaper ads—are more likely to
generate black applicants than are other methods.
Table 4 presents similar results to those from columns 1 and 4 of Table 3, but separately for
establishments located in central cities and those in the suburbs. Results are again presented for all jobs
and for those that do not require college. The results generally confirm findings from Table 2.  On the
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one hand, the educational requirements and occupations generally have larger effects on the race of
applicants at establishments in the central city, with those requiring less skill getting many more
applicants there. On the other hand, other characteristics such as industry and establishment size
generally have larger effects in the suburbs. These results confirm that less-educated blacks apply much
less frequently for suburban jobs, especially at smaller (or generally less salient) establishments.
A few specific cases present striking contrasts between the central-city and suburban effects. In
particular, public sector jobs receive far fewer black applicants in the suburbs than do other industries,
although this is not the case in central cities. State agencies, newspapers, and walk-ins generate many
black applicants in central cities but fewer in the suburbs.  In each case, these applicant flows seem to
23TABLE 4
Regressions for the Percentage of Applications Accounted for by Blacks: Central City versus Suburbs
                                Central City                                                                  Suburbs                                  
     All Jobs                  Noncollege Jobs                 All Jobs                   Noncollege Jobs             
11 21 12
Educational Requirements
College degree -.122 (.059) — — -.059 (.034) — —
High school diploma -.010 (.042) -.011 (.040) .025 (.036) -.018 (.025) -.021 (.023) -.033 (.022)
Occupations
Clerical/sales -.001 (.045) .056 (.053) .063 (.047) -.009 (.028) -.020 (.032) -.051 (.030)
Crafts -.011 (.080) -.033 (.085) -.026 (.076) -.055 (.040) -.060 (.041) -.061 (.037)
Operatives/labor .119 (.066) .167 (.069) .134 (.060) .004 (.038) -.003 (.038) -.017 (.036)
Service .177 (.062) .193 (.066) .112 (.058) .022 (.037) -.003 (.040) -.030 (.037)
Industries
Construction -.026 (.126) -.024 (.123) .001 (.109) -.033 (.073) -.060 (.068) -.017 (.063)
Manufacturing -.045 (.062) -.071 (.061) .034 (.057) -.019 (.034) -.044 (.033) .003 (.033)
TCU .012 (.071) .014 (.082) .045 (.072) .154 (.055) .126 (.051) .131 (.047)
Wholesale trade -.070 (.076) -.093 (.074) .039 (.067) .002 (.048) -.001 (.047) .037 (.043)
FIRE/services -.023 (.047) -.047 (.047) -.035 (.042) .011 (.029) -.014 (.028) .007 (.027)
Public .056 (.169) .014 (.189) .029 (.163) -.136 (.070) -.171 (.065) -.158 (.062)
Employees
1–50 -.001 (.036) -.023 (.040) -.033 (.038) -.120 (.024) -.157 (.025) -.132 (.025)
51–100 .029 (.047) -.021 (.054) -.005 (.049) -.138 (.036) -.143 (.036) -.134 (.033)
Unionization .184 (.053) .118 (.058) .081 (.053) -.037 (.031) -.011 (.034) -.007 (.032)
Public transit within ¼ mile — — .019 (.035) — — .062 (.021)
Relative distance to blacks — — -.346 (.132) — — -.160 (.055)
(table continues)TABLE 4, continued
                                Central City                                                                  Suburbs                                  
     All Jobs                  Noncollege Jobs                 All Jobs                   Noncollege Jobs             
11 21 12
Black customers — — .818 (.187) — — .343 (.119)
Black customers*customer
contact — — -.236 (.193) — — .246 (.130)
Black respondent — — .077 (.047) — — -.009 (.048)
Affirmative action in recruiting — — -.013 (.030) — — .010 (.020)
Recruiting Methods
Signs/walk-ins — — .020 (.036) — — -.014 (.022)
Referrals — — .013 (.046) — — .032 (.030)
Newspapers — — .057 (.030) — — .031 (.019)
State/community agencies — — .081 (.033) — — .050 (.022)
Private agencies — — .036 (.037) — — -.003 (.027)
Unions/schools — — .013 (.034) — — -.008 (.021)
R .332 .279 .489 .180 .204 .370
2
Sample size 393 364 364 626 580 580
Note: Columns with the heading of 2 in this table and those that follow correspond to specification 4 of Table 3.29
The application and new hire equations here are estimated as a system using Seemingly Unrelated
24
Regressions. Descriptions of the methods by which I calculated standard errors on the predicted values and the
ratios of predicted values are available from the author.
reflect local geographic factors, such as who the constituents of the local public sector are or the general
proximity of firms to various population groups.
C. Ratios of Black New Hires to Applicants: Regression Results
Table 5 presents results for the conditional demand for black applicants on the part of employers.
I measure this demand by the effect of any given characteristic on the ratio of black new hires to black
applicants, based on estimates from equations (1) and (2) that are used to generate predicted values of
each (as described in Section III).  Part A of Table 5 presents results for all jobs and for those that do not
24
require college degrees; part B presents results for noncollege jobs only in the central cities versus the
suburbs. Results are for the same two specifications used in Table 4.
The predicted values are calculated at the mean level of each independent variable except for the
one in question, which in most cases is a categorical variable taking on the value of one or zero. Where
continuous instead of categorical variables are considered, I generally use values representing the 25th
and 75th percentiles of the distribution for that variable. Standard errors on the ratios of these predictions
are provided as well.
As noted above, the results of part A of Table 5 parallel those of Tables 3 to a large extent,
indicating that blacks are more likely to apply for jobs where their probabilities of gaining employment
are relatively higher. Thus, black applicants are less likely to be hired in jobs requiring college or in
professional/managerial jobs (especially in central cities). Black applicants are also more likely to be
hired in the utilities, in medium-sized and large establishments, and in establishments with black
respondents or customers, where the latter is especially true in jobs with customer contact. These30
TABLE 5
Ratio of Predicted Values: New Hires to Applicants
A.                    All Jobs                            Noncollege Jobs         
1 212
Educational Requirements
College degree not required .735 (.041) .730 (.043) — —
College degree required .260 (.183) .392 (.137) — —
High school diploma not required .785 (.056) .782 (.059) .849 (.061) .828 (.065)
High school diploma required .554 (.058) .564 (.056) .651 (.044) .663 (.043)
Occupations
Managerial/professional .510 (.086) .550 (.081) .542 (.103) .582 (.094)
Clerical/sales .696 (.057) .691 (.059) .706 (.052) .711 (.054)
Crafts .685 (.159) .668 (.151) .713 (.144) .733 (.132)
Operatives/labor .823 (.104) .805 (.105) .826 (.089) .792 (.090)
Service .718 (.090) .697 (.095) .744 (.085) .735 (.091)
Industries
Construction .351 (.324) .457 (.257) .478 (.268) .550 (.228)
Manufacturing .331 (.100) .357 (.088) .435 (.086) .425 (.079)
TCU 1.166 (.153) 1.154 (.148) 1.078 (.130) 1.129 (.135)
Wholesale trade .626 (.181) .696 (.137) .698 (.150) .738 (.126)
Retail trade .687 (.085) .691 (.092) .740 (.074) .751 (.084)
FIRE/services .732 (.050) .734 (.055) .802 (.056) .814 (.062)
Public 1.288 (.728) 1.518 (.798) 1.178 (.635) 1.354 (.654)
Employees
1–50 .593 (.051) .591 (.050) .629 (.050) .642 (.050)
51–100 .804 (.107) .801 (.113) .823 (.105) .811 (.105)
> 100 .740 (.058) .752 (.063) .816 (.056) .806 (.061)
Unionization
Nonunion .679 (.041) .689 (.040) .718 (.039) .724 (.039)
Fully Unionized .634 (.076) .586 (.084) .700 (.084) .669 (.095)
Location
Central city .667 (.050) .625 (.068) .715 (.049) .682 (.067)
Suburbs .654 (.059) .692 (.051) .732 (.062) .764 (.054)
Other .708 (.077) .678 (.083) .682 (.074) .645 (.076)
Public Transit within ¼ Mile
No — .716 (.068) — .709 (.066)
Yes — .645 (.042) — .719 (.043)
(table continues)31
TABLE 5, continued
A.                    All Jobs                            Noncollege Jobs         
1 212
Relative Distance to Blacks
25th percentile — .673 (.043) — .701 (.043)
75th percentile — .664 (.054) — .735 (.057)
Black Customers
25th percentile — .455 (.086) — .536 (.075)
75th percentile — .763 (.044) — .837 (.052)
Black Customers*Customer Contact
25th percentile — .464 (.078) — .541 (.081)
75th percentile — .705 (.042) — .766 (.051)
Black Respondent
No — .645 (.036) — .701 (.036)
Yes — .936 (.120) — .876 (.118)
B.                                       Noncollege Jobs                                         
               Central City                                 Suburbs                 
121 2
Educational Requirements
High school diploma not required .739 (.095) .769 (.103) .931 (.116) .908 (.115)
High school diploma required .762 (.056) .751 (.055) .569 (.076) .575 (.078)
Occupations
Managerial/professional .378 (.172) .319 (.164) .808 (.166) .831 (.155)
Clerical/sales .741 (.070) .770 (.069) .585 (.101) .621 (.111)
Crafts 1.182 (.293) 1.045 (.277) .565 (.230) .593 (.210)
Operatives/labor .785 (.111) .815 (.116) .841 (.151) .705 (.151)
Service .865 (.104) .838 (.122) .697 (.167) .737 (.176)
Industries
Construction .555 (.322) .687 (.328) .864 (.519) .758 (.464)
Manufacturing .410 (.141) .464 (.128) .399 (.148) .279 (.141)
TCU .954 (.186) .948 (.189) 1.334 (.197) 1.409 (.216)
Wholesale trade .962 (.210) .982 (.173) .688 (.239) .729 (.227)
Retail trade 1.007 (.107) .917 (.117) .656 (.134) .742 (.160)
FIRE/services .699 (.070) .702 (.076) .719 (.109) .779 (.114)
Public 1.031 (.494) 1.062 (.515) 1.865(2.101) 2.384(3.207)
(table continues)32
TABLE 5, continued
B.                                       Noncollege Jobs                                         
               Central City                                 Suburbs                 
121 2
Employees
1–50 .605 (.065) .613 (.067) .572 (.099) .656 (.098)
51–100 .926 (.134) .897 (.128) .997 (.229) .936 (.239)
> 100 .951 (.089) .942 (.093) .750 (.083) .663 (.093)
Unionization
Nonunion .839 (.054) .842 (.053) .636 (.067) .620 (.067)
Fully unionized .331 (.127) .278 (.135) 1.007 (.214) 1.108 (.225)
Public Transit within ¼ Mile
No — .725 (.104) — .705 (.114)
Yes — .764 (.052) — .670 (.080)
Relative Distance to Blacks
25th percentile — .712 (.056) — .660 (.075)
75th percentile — .800 (.062) — .716 (.097)
Black Customers
25th percentile — .601 (.124) — .745 (.129)
75th percentile — .839 (.071) — .652 (.077)
Black Customers*Customer Contact
25th percentile — .699 (.113) — .365 (.142)
75th percentile — .776 (.058) — .624 (.070)
Black Respondent
No — .705 (.051) — .674 (.062)
Yes — 1.040 (.131) — .929 (.353)33
Of course, the standard errors on these estimates are quite large as well.
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This interpretation does, however, beg the question of why the employment of Hispanic applicants is
26
higher than that of black applicants in manufacturing, as seen in Table 2.
differences can be observed despite the fact that many of the hiring probabilities where demand is low
are likely upward biased by the low percentages of applications received in the first place.
Comparing central-city establishments with those in the suburbs in part B of Table 5, we find
some similarities as well as some differences in hiring patterns across locations. For instance, smaller
establishments hire relatively fewer black applicants in both locations, and the race of customers and
respondents is important in both (though the particular effect of having contact with white or black
customers matters more in the suburbs). But hiring patterns by education and occupation differ somewhat
across the two locations (with educational attainment having larger effects in the suburbs but
professional/managerial status of jobs mattering more in the city), and unions exert a relatively more
positive influence on the hiring of blacks in the suburbs.
By industry, we also find some similarities and some differences in hiring patterns between cities
and suburbs. On the one hand, hiring rates for blacks are high in the public sector, regardless of
location,  and they are relatively low in manufacturing, especially in many of the newer facilities being
25
located in suburban areas. The high probability that black applicants to suburban public sector jobs will
be hired suggests that other factors (such as informational limitations or high transit costs) are
substantially reducing black employment opportunities in this sector, while the low probability in
manufacturing might reflect growing skill needs in that sector related to a recent high level of
technological change (Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994).  On the other hand, the probabilities of
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blacks being hired in wholesale and retail trade establishments and in service jobs are relatively high in
central cities but low in the suburbs, consistent with results presented earlier.
One noteworthy difference between these results and those presented earlier is that the overall
effect of location in the central city seen in part A of Table 5 does not generate a higher likelihood of34
being hired once other characteristics of establishments and jobs are controlled for. Thus, it may not be
location per se that generates the lower tendency of black applicants to be hired in the suburbs, but rather
other characteristics of the jobs and establishments located there (such as their generally smaller size and
their lesser tendency to be unionized or in the service sector). Nevertheless, the lower tendency of these
establishments to hire black applicants, regardless of the cause, must be taken into account when we
consider the effects of labor market policies designed to improve the representation of blacks in these
establishments. And the results of part B of Table 5 still indicate some important differences between the
two areas in relative hiring probabilities within specific industry sectors.
Finally, I have computed similar application equations and ratios of predicted values for black
males versus black females and for Hispanics. These results, available from the author, largely confirm
the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 above.
D. Do These Factors Affect Wage and Employment Outcomes of Blacks?
Search theory suggests, and the data presented above confirm, that black applicants (like any
other group) are relatively rational, in the sense that they are more likely to apply to those establishments
where they have higher expected benefits (in terms of relative wages and their probabilities of being
hired). To the extent that this is true, a reallocation of applicants across establishments would not
necessarily lead to improved employment outcomes for that group. On the other hand, the data also
confirm that differential costs of search (because of uneven residential concentrations and transportation
difficulties), and perhaps limited information flows, reduce the flow of black applicants to suburban jobs
as well. If these forces are significant, there might be some scope for improving the employment
outcomes of blacks by redistributing the applicant flow, perhaps by lowering the search costs or
improving information flows about suburban jobs.
Unfortunately, it is somewhat difficult to infer from the data presented above what the
magnitudes of such effects would be. Simply reallocating applicants across jobs which are no more35
prevalent and offer no more compensation in one area than another might do little good. Given the lower
probabilities that black applicants currently face of being hired at suburban jobs, such a reallocation
might actually reduce their employment opportunities. On the other hand, if we can show that the areas
or firms to which blacks currently apply have fewer numbers of jobs available (relative to searchers) or
pay lower wages than those located elsewhere, then a stronger case can be made for the idea that
reallocating applicants will improve overall employment outcomes for that group.
In fact, such evidence has already been presented elsewhere, using these and other data. For
instance, while black residential areas are often located nearer to overall employment than are white
areas (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1996), they are often farther from the areas of greatest new net job growth
(Kain, 1992; Raphael, 1998). Also, Holzer (1996) shows that, after adjusting for commuter flows, the
ratio of jobs to people in the cities is lower than in the suburbs of most areas. Furthermore, Ihlanfeldt
(forthcoming) employs the same data that I have used here to show that vacancy rates in low-skill jobs
(particularly blue-collar and service jobs) are generally higher in areas that are farthest from black
residential concentrations. All of these findings suggest that a reallocation of black applicants would
increase the net number of jobs available to them and therefore improve their overall employment
opportunities.
Results on relative wages across establishments are similar. I have estimated equations in which
the dependent variable is the log of the starting hourly wage of the job, and the independent variables
include the percentage of applicants to the job who are black, as well as controls for the characteristics of
establishments, jobs, and workers hired (such as age, education, and gender). The results tell a clear
story: The earnings of blacks are reduced by a high flow of black applicants, while the earnings of other
workers are unaffected. Indeed, the results suggest that moving a black employee from an establishment36
Including the fractions of blacks among customers or whether the respondent is black reduces the
27
magnitudes of these estimates considerably but does not eliminate them.
with only black applicants to one with only white applicants would increase that employee’s wages by
30–40 percent.
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The results are clearly consistent with a “crowding” story, in which the wages of blacks are
driven downward by a large supply of applicants chasing a limited number of jobs. Other unobserved
characteristics of these establishments and/or jobs, such as lower product market rents to be shared with
employees or poorer capital/technology, might generate the same results (e.g., Bates, 1993; Holzer and
Ihlanfeldt, forthcoming). Under either scenario, a reallocation of black applicants toward other firms and
areas would improve their wages. Only if the lower wages of blacks in these establishments reflect
unobserved characteristics of the workers themselves (Hirsch and McPherson, 1994) would there be no
return to such a reallocation in the form of higher wages for blacks.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, I analyze the determinants of black applicant flows across establishments as well as
the conditional probabilities that these applicants will be hired. I find that establishments located in the
central cities of large metropolitan areas receive many more applications from black workers than do
establishments in the suburbs; these applicants are more likely to be hired in the city as well. Hispanic
applicants generally are hired at higher rates than are black applicants, while black female applicants
receive more job offers than their black male counterparts.
Our results show that a variety of characteristics of establishments and jobs, especially their
location, matter a great deal in terms of the extent to which blacks apply for work and are hired. The
greater tendency of blacks to apply for jobs located in central cities rather than suburbs is mostly
accounted for by the greater proximity of those jobs to their own residences and to public transit. Thus,37
the relative costs of applying seem to have important effects on the geographic concentration of applicant
flows. The race of customers and of those responsible for hiring affects black applicant flows to firms, as
do the recruitment methods used in the suburbs and in the cities; these factors suggest the importance of
information in accounting for the race of applicants. The flow of less-educated black applicants to
suburban jobs, especially in smaller establishments, is particularly low relative to that in the central city.
But we also find a relatively lower tendency on the part of suburban employers to hire blacks
into some categories of jobs and industries, such as clerical/sales and service jobs and those in wholesale
and retail trade. These findings are also consistent with the notion that blacks are less likely to be hired
into establishments where customers and those responsible for hiring are white. Small establishments in
the suburbs (as well as the central city) also have relatively lower tendencies to hire those blacks who do
apply for work there, perhaps due to less concern over EEO pressure. Black males are less successful
than their female counterparts in gaining employment in retail trade or service sector jobs for the less-
educated in the suburbs. In contrast, Hispanics are more likely to apply and far more likely to be hired
into blue-collar jobs and some segments of the manufacturing and service sectors. But there are some
segments of the suburban labor market (such as public sector jobs) to which few blacks apply despite
apparently high probabilities of their being hired there.
These findings have some significant implications for urban labor market policies. For one thing,
it is important to reduce the costs incurred by central-city blacks when they apply to suburban employers
and to improve the flow of information about employment opportunities there. We especially need to
improve the flow of less-educated black applicants to smaller and medium-sized suburban establishments
where few such blacks now apply, despite the relatively greater tightness of those labor markets and
relatively higher wages for less-skilled workers there.
Of course, any policies that improve the access of central-city residents to suburban housing
would help to accomplish this, in addition to overcoming the negative effects on educational and38
See Harrison and Weiss (1998) for more discussion of CET and other examples of apparently successful
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local labor market intermediaries.
behavioral outcomes associated with growing up in racially and/or economically segregated urban
environments (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Jargowsky, 1997). The potential benefits, but also limitations,
of doing so are discussed at length elsewhere (e.g., Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1991; Katz, Kling, and
Liebman, 1997; Haar, 1996; Briggs, 1997).
More modest and less politically controversial approaches take residences as given and focus on
the “mobility” of residents to suburban jobs. Transportation assistance, job placement activities, and job
search assistance all can be approaches used by labor market intermediaries, at relatively low cost per job
applicant, to improve the flow of black applicants to suburban employers. Indeed, many current
discussions of aiding the “welfare-to-work” transition for unskilled women focus on these kinds of
activities (e.g., Roberts, 1998), and many states currently use some version of these approaches. As noted
above, the “Bridges to Work” demonstration project highlights these approaches, as have other such
programs that have been undertaken (but not seriously evaluated) at the local level (e.g., Hughes and
Sternberg, 1992). Even “school-to-work” programs can sometimes be used to bridge these gaps if
suburban employers are willing to become involved with schools in inner-city areas. And some
apparently successful training programs for disadvantaged workers, such as the Center for Employment
and Training (CET), rely heavily on their links to local employers throughout the metropolitan area to
provide customized training and successful job placements for participating workers.
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But the success of these approaches will clearly depend on the willingness of employers to hire
the applicants generated through this process, and the data here suggest that this willingness is relatively
low in many key sectors of the suburban labor market. Of course, the hiring of black applicants may
depend on a number of factors besides discriminatory preferences of suburban employers, such as the
relative skills of the applicants generated, the strength of ties between the local intermediary and area39
employers, and the tightness of the local labor market. When employers have confidence in the
intermediaries, they will take more seriously the information about job candidates that the latter provide.
When labor markets are unusually tight (as is currently the case), employers are more willing than usual
to consider sources of employees that they otherwise would not.
If an increased flow of apparently qualified applicants does not then generate a commensurate
increase in their employment rates, some legal basis might exist for targeting these establishments for
greater enforcement of EEO laws. The data presented here suggest that small establishments with many
white customers, especially those in the retail trade and service sectors, tend to hire relatively few of the
blacks (especially males) who apply for jobs. Mobility programs that increase the supply of black
applicants to such suburban establishments might, therefore, be complementary with targeted EEO
enforcement that should raise the demand for such applicants.
But cost-effective ways of monitoring the behavior of small establishments would have to be
developed, and data would have to be available on the demographics of their applicant pool. The use of
auditors to infer the willingness of employers to hire qualified minority applicants is one approach to this
problem, although the legal status of such auditors remains unresolved. Also, a strategy of relying on the
“stick” of EEO enforcement against recalcitrant employers would not be complementary with the
“carrot” of using local intermediaries to develop good relations with these same employers; presumably
the former would only be used in cases where the latter proves ineffective.
Finally, the need to ensure that black applicants in the suburbs have good credentials and job
qualifications remains critical as well. School reform efforts that aim to improve the basic cognitive skills
of inner-city students, as well as efforts to improve the “school-to-work” transition and enable more of
these young people to gain good early work experience, must also be key components of any strategy to
improve the access of young urban blacks to the suburban job market (Holzer, 1998).4041
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